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THE TAX IMPLICATIONS OF
RECIPROCAL TRUSTS
J. HENRY LANDMAN
CROSSED trusts, proven reciprocal in substance, are because of
this fact uncrossed for federal tax purposes into independent trusts
with their own respective estate, gift and income tax consequences.
Estate tax planners will find the device of reciprocal trusts for tax
minimization fraught with almost insuperable obstacles in judicial,
statutory and Treasury administrative law.'
I. ESTATE TAXES
A LEADING decision on this subject is the Lehman case. It germi-
nated the doctrine which bears its name. In 1930, Allan S. Lehman
and his brother simultaneously created trusts for one another's bene-
fit. They contained the same terms and were organized in consider-
ation for one another. They each had the right to draw down equal
amounts of money. The Second Circuit Court held that the with-
drawal from the brother's trust estate was includible in the gross
estate of the decedent-brother as a transfer subject to a power to
alter, amend or revoke a trust.2
In the Lueders' Estate (City Farmers Bank Farmers Trust Co.)
case the trust for the decedent's benefit was not includible in the lat-
ter's estate because of the absence of the proximity of time in the
drafting of the two trusts and of the nonexistence of mutual consid-
eration.3 The need for concurrency in the drafting of converse
trusts as an indispensable factor in the proof by the Treasury for
reciprocity is further borne out in the cases of the Estate of Freder-
J. IEnvR LANxDAN is Professor of Law, New York Law School.
1 A few law review articles on this subject are: Hepler and Bebenek, Reciprocal
Trusts, 30 NoTRE DA= LAw. 149 (1954); Walker, Reciprocal Trusts and the Federal
Estate Tax: Economic Realty Disregarded, 5 DUKE B. J. 33 (1955); Lyman, Recipro-
cal Trusts in Estate and Gift Taxation, 42 CAnI. L. Rxv. 151 (1954); Colgan and
Molloy, Converse Trusts-The Rise and Fall of a Tax Avoidance Device, 3 TAx L.
REV. 271 (1948); Callman, The Lehman Doctrine, Its Significance and Application,
26 TAXEs 233 (1948); Marx, The Switching of Settlors in Inter-Vivos Trusts, 26 TAXES
622 (1948).
2 The Tax Act of 1926, § 302(d) is involved. Allan S. Lehman et al., 39 B. T. A.
17, aff'd 109 F. 2d 99 (2d Cir. 1940), 24 Am. Fed. Tax R. 198 (1940), cert. den.,
310 U. S. 637, 60 S. Ct. 1080, 84 L. Ed. 1406 (1940).
3 Lueders' Est. (City Bank Farmers Trust Co.) v. Commissioner, 164 F. 2d 128
(3d Cir. 1947), 36 Am. Fed. Tax R, 233, rev'g 6 T. C. 587.
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ick S. Fish4 and of Fred C. Sctoller.'
In the Cole case in 1931, two spouses created simultaneous and
irrevocable living trusts the income of each of which was to be paid
to the other spouse, their children and grandchildren for life, termi-
nating upon the death of the last survivor named. The Eighth Cir-
cuit agreed with the Tax Court that while the transfers of the prop-
erty to the opposing trust were not made in contemplation of death,
each spouse was the real owner of such corpus and therefore includi-
ble in his or her own gross estate.6
The Lehman Doctrine invalidated reciprocal trusts as estate and
income tax minimization devices. In numerous cases7 adjudicated on
this principle, the courts have placed the burden of rebutting the
Treasury's inference of reciprocity on the estate's representative. The
Second Circuit has been the leading-proponent of the view that the
exchange of similar powers over trusts of almost concurrent creation
by settlors of close kinship gives rise to a conclusive inference of
reciprocity, rebuttable by the taxpayer by a preponderance of evi-
dence to show that the simultaneity of several events of the various
parties was without concerted action.
To undo this practically worthless tax saving plan, taxpayers be-
come once again subject to the gift tax law in order to retransfer the
property and income of the respective trusts. Therefore a statute was
enacted in the year 1949 to enable creators of reciprocal trusts estab-
lished prior to January 1, 1940 to annul their vain and futile tax
machinations by relinquishing their powers over the trust principal
and income without gift tax imputations, provided the relinquishment
took place before 1951 and a gift tax was paid in the first transfer
to the trust. In addition thereto, this relinquishment will not be treat-
ed as having been done in contemplation of death and therefore not
4 Estate of Frederick S. Fish, 45 B. T. A. 120 (1941), dismissed by the Second
Circuit Court on January 20, 1942, following Lehman v. Commissioner, 109 F. 2d 99
(2d Cir. 1940) and the Estate of Mary H. Hughes, 44 B. T. A. 1196 (1941).
5 Fred C. Scholler, Ex'r, 44 B. T. A. 235, dismissed Aug. 1, 1942.
6 Estate of H. S. Cole, f1 43,014 P-H Memo T. C., aff'd without discussion (8th
Cir. 1944). See also, Estate of Thomas Neal, f1 43,518 P-H Memo T. C. .
7 Other decisions following the Lehman Doctrine are: Orvis, Ex'r v. Higgins, 180
F. 2d 537 (2d Cir. 1950), rev'g 80 F. Supp. 64 (D. C. N. Y. 1949), 37 Am. Fed.
Tax R. 402 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U. S. 810, 71 S. Ct. 37, 95 L. Ed. 595
(1950); Hanauer's Estate (Strauss) v. Commissioner, 149 F. 2d 857 (2d Cir. 1945),
33 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1474, aff'g ff 43,502 P-H Memo T. C., cert. denied, 326 U. S. 770,
66 S. Ct. 175, 90 L. Ed. 465 (1945); Estate of Oliver v. Commissioner, 148 F. 2d
210 (3d Cir. 1945), 33 Am. Fed. Tax R. 912, aff'g ff 44,138 P-H Memo T. C.; Estate
of Elizabeth D. Hill (2d Cir. Jan. 1956).
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subject to estate tax as well, in the instance of decedents who died
after February 10, 1939. 8
The broad application of the Lehman Doctrine was restricted in
the year 1953 by the opinion in the Estate of M. H. Newberry.9 The
facts therein were that the decedent and her husband had at the same
time created trusts for the ultimate benefit of their children. The
amounts involved were equal, and the trust instruments were also
in all other respects alike. Although the transferred properties were
nearly indistinguishable, the court decided that the testimony had
conclusively shown absence of such unity and interdependence of
action in a quid pro quo sense. This decision reversed the Tax
Court10 where reciprocity had been found on the basis of similar terms
of the trust instruments, the relationship of the settlors, the simul-
taneity of creation, and the equal number of shares of stock in each
trust.
The effect of this Third Circuit reversal of the Tax Court is
that the Treasury is denied a favorable inference of reciprocity out
of identical cross trusts. The burden of persuasion is thus placed on
the Treasury as the proponent of reciprocity in any given situation.
Proof must be adduced by it to establish a mutual intent to avoid tax
by the use of the cross trust device.
The recent McLain"' decision followed the Newberry Doctrine
and specifically repudiated the Second Circuit's version of the Leh-
man Doctrine. It holds that consideration inferred from the creation
of identical trusts will not stand. Evidence must be supplied which
will establish intent to avoid taxes, and the bargain and exchange
between the grantors.'2
The creation of reciprocal trusts might conceivably be effected
in contemplation of death and therefore the transferred corpus would
be includible in the decedent's estate. Living transfers made in con-
templation of death without adequate consideration are includible
in decedent's estate for estate tax purposes. More specifically those
made within three years prior to decedent's death are subject to the
rebuttable presumption that the transfers were made in contemplation
8 Technical Changes Act of 1949, 63 STAT. 891 (1949), added §§ 1000(g), 811(d)
of the 1939 Code.
9 Estate of M. H. Newberry, et al. v. Commissioner, 201 F. 2d 874 (3d Cir.
1953).
10 17 T. C. 597 (1951).
31 H. C. McLain, Ex'r v. Jarecki, 126 F. Supp. 621 (N. D. Il. 1955).
12 The terms "settlors," "grantors" and "creators" are used as interchangeable
words in this article to aid in clarifying its fundamental ideas.
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of death if they constitute a material part of the estate and were in
the nature of a final distribution. Transfers prior to the three-year
period are not considered at all as in contemplation of death.
13
In the absence of a contemplation of death, transfers that take
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death as in the case of
a life estate or power of revocation in the donor, are taxable in the
decedent's estate. In reverter cases, only the value of the property
subject to the reverter and not of the reverter is subject to estate tax.'4
Finally, all transfers, in trust or otherwise, where the decedent
reserved the right, either alone or with any other person or persons,
to designate the persons who shall enjoy the property, or where the
decedent reserved the power to change the beneficiaries, are includible
in the decedent's estate. 5
II. INCOME TAXES
RECIPROCAL trusts also have federal income tax implications. As
a tax avoidance plan, reciprocal trusts are expected by the transfers
of property to escape estate taxes and also the income taxes on the
earnings and profits from these properties. Just as reciprocal trusts
are relative failures, they have also proven to be unsuccessful as
federal income tax minimizers. As in the field of estate and gift taxes,
the income tax consequences depend upon the provisions of the trust
instruments. Once trusts are found to be reciprocal, their estate,
gift and income tax consequences become interdependent. Crossed
trusts proven reciprocal are treated as uncrossed for federal income
as well as for estate and gift taxes.
For income tax purposes, a grantor is taxable on that part of the
trust income which may be presently or in the future distributed to
13 Int. Rev. Code of 1939 § 811 (1), 44 STAT. 70 (1926) (now INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 2038, Reg. 105, § 81.20). Prior to Sept. 24, 1950, transfers more than two
years prior to death could not be taxed or challenged as taxable.
14 Int. Rev. Code of 1939 § 811(c)(h)(i); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2035-
2037, 2043(a), 2044; Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 60 S. Ct. 444, 84 L. Ed.
604 (1940); Technical Changes Act of 1949; Klein v. United States, 283 U. S. 231,
51 S. Ct. 398, 75 L. Ed. 996 (1931); United States v. Artemus C. Wells, et al. Ex'r,
283 U. S. 102, 51 S. Ct. 446, 75 L. Ed. 867 (1931), 9 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1440, af'g
39 F. 2d 998 (Ct. Cl. 1930), 8 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1064.
15 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811(d), 44 STAT. 70 (1926) (now INT. REV. CODE or
1954, § 2038, Reg. 105, § 81.20; Giannini v. Commissioner, 148 F. 2d 285 (9th Cir.
1945), 33 Am. Fed. Tax R. 927, aff'g 2 T. C. 1160, cert. denied, 326 U. S. 730, 66
S. Ct. 38, 90 L. Ed. 1091 (1945); Mollenberg's Estate v. Commissioner, 173 F. 2d
698 (2d Cir. 1949), 37 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1196, aff'g U1 47,332 P-H Memo T. C.; May,
Ex'r v. McGowan, 97 F. Supp. 326 (D. C. N. Y. 1950), ff 72,417 P-H Fed. (1951);
Estate of Ambrose Fry (Mitchell), 9 T. C. 503 (1947); Central Trust Co., Admin.
v. United States, 167 F. 2d 133 (6th Cir. 1948).
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him in the discretion of the grantor or of any person not having a sub-
stantial adverse interest in the disposition of such part of the in-
come. 16 In the Tobin case" the Fifth Circuit held that the trusts in
question were not reciprocal because the terms were not identical and
an advisory committee, made up mostly of persons other than the
grantor or beneficiary, controlled the income and principal available
for distribution.
The United States Supreme Court in the famous Clifford case
held that the income of a trust is taxable to the grantor under Sec-
tion 22 (a) of the 1939 Code although it is not payable to the grantor
himself and is not to be applied in satisfaction of his legal obligation,
if he has retained so complete a control of the trust that he is still
in practical effect the owner of its income. In the Stuart case the
Supreme Court held that where the Clifford Doctrine applies not only
Section 22(a) but also Sections 167(a)(1) and (2) of the 1939 Code,
supra, also apply. 9
The Clifford Doctrine caused so much litigation that the Treasury
promulgated regulations applicable to taxable years beginning after
December 31, 1945. They define and specify the factors that demon-
strate grantor's retention of trust control sufficient to constitute con-
structive receipt of the income therefrom. Generally the grantor is
taxable on trust income if he has a reversionary interest after a rela-
tively short term, a power to determine or control beneficial enjoy-
rment of income or corpus, or administrative control of the trust."
These Clifford Treasury regulations under the 1939 Code remain
as yet unchanged. They explain more specifically as to short term
trusts that trust income is taxable to a grantor who has a reversion-
ary interest in corpus or income to take effect within 10 years and
15 years in certain specified cases. In the Clark case,2 the Tax Court
16 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 167(a) (1) (2), 52 SrAT. 519 (now INT. Rav. CODE OF
1954, § 677).
17 Tobin v. Commissioner, 183 F. 2d 919 (5th Cir. 1950), 39 Am. Fed. Tax R.
822, rev'g 11 T. C. 928 (1949). See, also, D. G. McDonald, et al., 19 T. C. 672
(1952); Oleta A. Ewald, 2 T. C. 384 (1944), aff'd 141 F. 2d 750 (6th Cir. 1944),
32 Am. Fed. Tax R. 482; Irish v. Commissioner, 129 F. 2d 468 (3d Cir. 1942), 29
Am. Fed. Tax R. 932, aff'g 43 B. T. A. 864.
18 Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331, 60 S. Ct. 554, 84 L. Ed. 788, 23 Am. Fed.
Tax R. 1077 (1940).
19 Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U. S. 154, 63 S. Ct. 140, 87 L. Ed. 154, 29 Am. Fed.
Tax R. 1209 (1942).
20 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61, Reg. 118, ff 39.22(a)-21.
21 Comrfissioner v. Clark et al., 202 F. 2d 94 (7th Cir. 1953), aff'g 17 T. C.
1357 (1951). See, also, Central Nat. Bank of Cleveland, 141 F. 2d 352 (6th Cir.
1944).
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refused to apply this strict ten-year rule and held that the grantor
was not taxable on the income from a charitable trust solely on the
ground that he had a reversionary interest in corpus that was to take
effect in 9 instead of 10 years. On appeal, the Tax Court's decision
was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit but this Court decided that the
trust term was actually 10 and not 9 years. It also held that the
10 year provision of the regulation was unreasonable, arbitrary and
unconstitutional and could not be applied retroactively to the trust
in question. Deductions, like income, are to be computed as if they
were those of the taxpayer individually.2
To prevent the use of transfers in trust as a means of avoiding
taxes by the grantor, Sections 166 and 167 of the 1939 Code, known
as Sections 676 and 677 of the 1954 Code, had been enacted. This is
accomplished by creating exceptions to the general rule that trust
income is either taxable to the trustee or the beneficiary. One excep-
tion under Sections 166 and 167 provides that the grantor remains
subject to income taxes on trust income where the trust principal is
regarded as being owned by the grantor as in the case of a revocable
trust. He is not so taxable if the power of revocation is held by, or
shared with a person who has a substantial adverse interest. A mere
possibility of a reversion does not make the grantor taxable.23 Income
of trusts are taxable to the grantor where the latter retains an inter-
est in the trust. This would be so if -the income is accumulated for
the grantor, or the trust income is distributable to the grantor, or the
trust income may be applied to pay premiums on the insurance policies
on the life of the grantor. Beginning in 1943 discretionary trusts for
maintenance or support of wife or minor child whom the grantor is
legally obligated to support, render the grantor subject to income
22 Silverthau v. United States, 26 F. Supp. 242 (D. Conn. 1938), 22 Am. Fed.
Tax R. 558; Mary E. Wenger, 42 B. T. A. 225 (N. A. C. B. 1940-2, p. 14), aff'd
127 F. 2d 523 (6th Cir. 1942), 29 Am. Fed. Tax R. 329, cert. denied, 317 U. S. 646,
63 S. Ct. 40, 87 L. Ed. 527 (1942); Balch, 44 B. T. A. 269, aff'd, 129 F. 2d 472
(6th Cir. 1942), 29 Am. Fed. Tax R. 936; Cochran v. United States, 105 Ct. Cl. 628
(1945).
23 Reg. 118, ff 39.166-1 for years beginning 1946. Fulham v. Commissioner, 110
F. 2d 916 (1st Cir. 1940), 24 Am. Fed. Tax R. 812, af'g, 40 B. T. A. 48; Reinecke v.
Smith, 289 U. S. 172, 53 S. Ct. 570, 77 L. Ed. 1109, 12 Am. Fed. Tax R. 47 (1933),
rev'g, 61 F. 2d 324 (7th Cir. 1932); Helvering v. Wood, 309 U. S. 344, 60 S. Ct.
551, 84 L. Ed. 796 (1940), aff'g, 104 F. 2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1939) which aff'd 37 B. T. A.
1065; Carkhuff v. Commissioner, 83 F. 2d 626 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied, Oct. 12,
1936; Sterling Morton, 38 B. T. A. 1283, af'd, 109 F. 2d 47 (7th Cir. 1940), 24 Am.
Fed. Tax R. 188; Harry' J. Miller, II 53,160 P-H Memo T. C.; Welch v. Bradley, 130
F. 2d 109 (1st Cir. 1942), 29 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1062, rev'g, 37 F. Supp. 788 (D. Mass.
1941), 26 Am. Fed. Tax. R. 941. Reg. 118, ff 39.22(a)-21.
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taxes therefor if he, acting as trustee, or another person, so does but
only to the extent that the expenditures are made.24 Income of trusts
used to satisfy grantor's other legal obligations are also taxable to
the grantor.2 5 The income of trusts in which grantor retains sub-
stantial dominion or control over the trust corpus is also taxable to
the grantor.20
The Clifford regulations,27 promulgated in the year 1947, proved
so salutory despite much grumbling and the charge of unconstitution-
ality" that they were incorporated in large measure as Sections 671
through 678 o Subpart E of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code.
The 1954 Code thus provides that the income of a trust may be
taxable to the grantor rather than to the trustee or beneficiary. The
grantor is taxable if he retains a reversionary interest in the trust
corpus or income which may take effect within 10 years from the
creation of the trust. However, if the trust income is payable to an
income beneficiary for life with a reversion in the grantor, the latter
is not taxable on the income even though the life expectancy of the
income beneficiary is less than 10 years. On the other hand, if the
trust income is payable only to a designated school, hospital or a
church, the grantor will not be taxable because of the grantor's re-
versionary interest unless the reversion will take place within two
years. 9
The grantor is taxable on the trust income if he or an adverse
party or both have the power to dispose of the corpus or income
24 Reg. 118, ff 39.167-1,2. Everett D. Graff, 40 B. T. A. 920, aff'd, 117 F. 2d 247
(7th Cir. 1941), 26 Am. Fed. Tax R. 395; Kent v. Rothensies, 120 F. 2d 476 (3d Cir.
1941), 27 Am. Fed. Tax R. 465, cert. denied, 314 U. S. 659, 62 S. Ct. 113, 86 L. Ed.
528 (1941); Kent v. United States, 103 Ct. Cl. 714, 60 F. Supp. 203 (1945), 33 Am.
Fed. Tax R. 1308; McDonald, et al., 19 T. C. 672 (1953), Oleta A. Ewald, 2 T. C.
384 (1943), aff'd, 141 F. 2d 750 (6th Cir. 1944); Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670, 53
S. Ct. 761, 77 L. Ed. 1439 (1933), 12 Am. Fed. Tax R. 65, revig, 63 F. 2d 425 (8th
Cir. 1932); Du Pont v. Commissioner, 289 U. S. 685, 53 S. Ct. 766, 77 L. Ed. 1447
(1933), af'g, 63 F. 2d 44 (3d Cir. 1933); Henry G. Miller, et al., ff 52,208 P-H Memo
T. C.; Edgar E. Peieris, 12 T. C. 741 (1949); Estate of Emanuel Sturman, 11 T. C.
890 (1948).
25 Douglas v. Wificuts, 296 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 59, 80 L. Ed. 3 (1935); Reg. 118,
ff 39.167-1; Sokol, 7 T. C. 567 (1946); Hamilton et al., ff 45,299 P-H Memo T. C.;
Krause, ff 45,299 P-H Memo T. C.
26 Reg. 118, g 39-22(a)-21; Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331, 62 S. Ct. 333,
84 L. Ed. 788 (1940); Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U. S. 154, 63 S. Ct. 140, 87 L. Ed.
154 (1942).
27 Reg. 118. § 39.22(a).
28 Commissioner v. Clark, et al., 202 F. 2d 94 (7th Cir. 1953), af'g, 17 T. C.
1357 (1951).
29 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170(b)(1)(a).
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without the consent of any adverse party. However, the power in
anyone will not cause the income to be taxed to the grantor (a) to
apply trust income to support grantor's dependents except to the ex-
tent so applied, (b) to change the distribution of income only after
10 years of the existence of a trust, (c) to affect by will the distribu-
tion of the current inc6me except the accumulated income of a trust,
(d) to shift corpus or income from one charity to another, (e) to
invade corpus for the benefit of any designated beneficiary, (f) to
postpone payment of income to a beneficiary for a reasonable time,
(g) to postpone payment of income to a beneficiary during his
minority or disability, and (h) to apportion receipts and disburse-
ments between corpus and income according to sound trust account-
ing principles."°
The grantor is not taxed on trust income if the power to dis-
tribute corpus or income within a class of beneficiaries is held by a
person other than the grantor or one related and subservient to him.
Nor is he taxed on the trust income if the power to apportion in-
come among a class of beneficiaries according to a reasonably definite
external standard recited in the trust agreement, such as illness or
education, is held by a trustee other than the grantor or his wife.
However, if any person has a power to add to the designated bene-
ficiaries except after-born or after-adopted children, the income is
taxable to the grantor.
The grantor is taxable on trust income where the administration
of the trust is exercisable chiefly for the benefit of the grantor rather
than the beneficiaries. This would be true if, for example, the power
vested in the grantor or in a nonadverse party, or both, without ap-
proval of an adverse party, to deal with the trust property or income
for inadequate consideration, or if the power similarly vested enabled
the grantor to borrow trust corpus or income without adequate inter-
est or security. The grantor would also be taxable on the trust in-
come where the grantor had directly or indirectly borrowed trust
corpus or income and had not repaid same by the end of the taxable
year, or if the general powers of administration exercisable by anyone
redounded to the grantor's advantage.
The trust income is taxable to the grantor if he or anyone with-
out adverse interest has the power to revoke the trust. But if this
power is not exercisable for 10 years or two years in the case of
30 Id. § 674.
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charitable trusts after its creation, the grantor is not taxed on the
income during that period. He will be taxable thereon after this
period unless he renounces the power to revoke.
3 1
Income for the benefit of the grantor is taxable to him if it is
or may be in the discretion of the grantor or a nonadverse party, dis-
tributed to the grantor, accumulated for future distribution to him,
or used to pay premiums on his life insurance policies except policies
irrevocably payable to charity. But trust income is taxable to the
grantor, only to the extent that the income is applied for, to support
or maintain beneficiaries whom he is obligated to so treat.32
A power to acquire or release trust corpus or income may render
a person other than the grantor subject to income taxes thereon. How-
ever this general rule is excepted if the grantor is already taxable on
its income, or if the other person actually applies the trust income
to support a legal dependent, or if such other person disclaims this
power soon after he discovers it.
33
III. CONCLUSION
THE use of reciprocal trusts as a means of minimizing estate and
income taxes has proven to be a vain and futile device. Even though
the Newberry Doctrine of 1953 restricts the broad application of the
Lehman Doctrine by requiring the Treasury to adduce evidence to
establish tax avoidance by more than a coincidence of a number of
simultaneous factors, taxpayers should not expect much tax saving
appeal from the new doctrine.
In conclusion it must be acknowledged that the federal estate
and income tax savings of cross trusts can be salvaged by taking
adequate precautions to insulate the trusts against the imputation of
reciprocity. This can be achieved by avoiding the use of substan-
tially identical provisions and the same draftsmen, and the execu-
tion of the trusts at about the same time in consideration for one
another.
31 Id. § 676.
32 Id. § 677.
33 Id. § 678.
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